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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
KENNETH B. ELLIS, : Case No. 970294-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
A CONTINUANCE UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY 
PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
To preserve an issue for appeal, Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence (1998) requires a moving party to state all claims of 
error on the record in the trial court by a "timely objection or 
motion . . . , stating the specific ground of the objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the context." See also, 
State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35, cert, denied 493 U.S. 814, 
110 S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). "One of the primary reasons 
for imposing waiver rules like rule 103 (a) [] is to assure that the 
trial court has the first opportunity to address a claim that it 
erred. If the trial court already has had that opportunity, the 
justification for rigid waiver requirements is weakened 
considerably." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). 
The State contends that appellate review is precluded in this 
case because Ellis argued only that the newly discovered witness 
testimony would have impeachment value; "[t]here is nothing in 
[Ellis'] argument to suggest to the trial court that the purpose 
for seeking the continuance was to obtain substantive, material 
evidence." S.B. 13.1 
A reading of the transcript reveals that Ellis preserved his 
claim of error on the issue as he presented it for appeal. On 
appeal, Ellis argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the continuance because Meek's2 information "provided 
substantive evidence in support of Ellis' defense theory, as well 
as impeach Irvin's denial of a drug deal and marijuana use." 
Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at 8. Ellis argued at the hearing 
1
 The State alternatively contends that this Court should 
refuse to review Ellis' issues on appeal. See S.B. 13. The 
State specifically argues that a continuance is not merited 
because Ellis did not offer adequate foundation for Meek's 
testimony and, in any event, the testimony would have impeachment 
value alone and therefore a continuance is not merited. Id. 
(citing State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982) (court does 
not abuse discretion in denying continuance where new information 
would only impeach witness)). 
As an initial matter, this Court has already made the 
determination that Ellis' issue on appeal is meritorious to the 
extent that it has allowed the case to go to full briefing. See, 
e.g., Utah R. App. P. 10(e) (1998) ("[t]he court, upon its own 
motion, . . . may summarily affirm the judgment . . . if it 
plainly appears that no substantial question is presented"). If 
the State felt that "grounds for review [were] so insubstantial 
as not to merit further proceedings and consideration," it should 
have filed a motion for summary affirmance within ten days after 
filing of the docketing statement. Utah R. App. P. 10(a) (1) 
(1998) . 
In any event, Ellis' issue as presented for appeal is not 
meritless for lack of foundation or substantive grounds. The 
State's foundation argument will be addressed in Point II herein. 
The State's meritorious issue argument, i.e. whether a 
continuance is required where the new evidence will impeach 
Irvin's testimony, is fully addressed in Ellis' opening brief. 
See A.B. 11-13. 
2
 In his opening brief, Ellis referred to Meek as "Meek." 
The State, on the other hand, uses the spelling "Meek." Due to 
the poor quality of the transcript, it is difficult to tell which 
is the appropriate spelling. Ellis defers to the State's 
spelling and shall use "Meek" throughout this brief and at 
argument. 
2 
before the trial judge: 
" [a] lthough we have rested, thi^ ^ new information that 
may be important to the case; the reason being is Mr. 
Irvin indicated that he doesn't use drugs He also 
indicated that . . . his usual practice is not to buy 
drugs from strangers, which if we were to find the person 
who he owes money to for drugs . . . that would impeach 
that statement that - - h e didn't say that he meant that 
for face value, that he meant it sarcastically." 
See RecoI'd ("" hi" ") , 
The State's narrow reading of the transcript ignores the fact 
that reviewing court? do not apply a strict verbati m analysis in 
determining whethe ^ L - . . -. • • • :i ssi le fc a: appeal. 
See State v. Seale, 853 F.2d 862, 874 (Utah 1993) (defendant did 
not waive appeal where qrcunds for objection were vague but 
nonetheless apparent, irorn L : i e c o I I L e x _ • .)i opi i at:e f :: :II : 
a reviewing court t;o construe an objection embrace issues 
reasonab] y i nclirilei within the scope of the objection," State v. 
Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah I^9b Hence, courts look to the 
overall context and preclude appeal only where there are extreme 
d 3 fferences between the ai : gi lments presented at trial and the issues 
presented for appeal jl. 
3
 Indeed, the cases relied on by the State in support of 
its argument are distinguishable on this basis. In those cases, 
the grounds asserted on appeal were not "reasonably included 
within the scope of the objection," Smith, 909 P.2d at 244, and, 
in fact, bore little or no legal relationship to those asserted 
at trial. See, e.g., State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 
1982) (trial objection that evidence lacked foundation was not 
appealable on prejudice grounds); State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 
495 (Utah App. 1992) (declining review under Rule 404 where 
defendant objected at trial on grounds of improper form, assuming 
facts, irrelevance, and Rule 403 exclusion); State v. Ramos, 882 
P.2d 14 9, 155 n.3 (Utah App. 1994) (declining review based on 
alleged violation of confrontation right where objection at trial 
was that question was leading); State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 
3 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the grounds for objection 
argued at trial are at least "reasonably included within the scope 
of the objection," if not the same as those asserted below. Id. 
Ellis specifically stated with regard to the newly discovered 
witnesses, "this is new information that may be important to the 
case." R.137[3]. Ellis' use of the word "important" is synonymous 
with "substantive" and "material." Likewise, "case" refers to 
Ellis' overall theory that Irvin was not a victim of theft, but 
rather a disgruntled party to a drug deal where he forfeited some 
money. 
Assuming, but not conceding, that Ellis' argument is vague, it 
is nonetheless sufficiently "apparent from the context" of the 
transcript such that the argument is preserved for appeal. Utah R. 
Evid. 103 (a) . In the analogous case of Seale, the defendant 
asserted a general hearsay objection to a witness' statement at 
trial. 853 P. 2d at 874. The trial court overruled the objection 
on the grounds that the statements were admissible as prior 
consistent statements. Id. Defendant appealed on the grounds 
articulated by the court. Id. This Court held that the issue was 
713 (Utah App. 1990) (appeal precluded where defendant objected 
to evidence as leading at trial, then as inadmissible under Rule 
608 and State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), on appeal); 
Green v. State, 956 S.W.2d 849, 856 (Ark. 1997) (no preservation 
where defendant argued at trial that evidence was improper 
impeachment evidence, then argued that it was inadmissible under 
Ark. R. Evid. 609 on appeal); State v. Prioleau, 664 A.2d 743, 
762 (Conn. 1995) (no preservation where defendant argued lack of 
relevancy at trial then appealed on the grounds of improper 
impeachment method); State v. Guloy, 705 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Wash. 
1985) (no preservation where defendant either did not articulate 
grounds of error at trial or argued improper impeachment, then 
appealed under hearsay rule). 
4 
preserved for appeal since it was "'apparent from the context'" of 
tl le pi oceedii lg. la, •, . .• -. i '"' 
Seale's objection was vague, cne judge clearly understooa 1*: when 
he ruled that the statement was admissible as a prior consistent 
staLeme: " J. 
The instant case does not present such an attenuated link 
between the trial objection and the issue presented for appeal as 
i n Seale , whei e thi s Cour t: found pi esei v at:i 01 1 noi iet.1 leless , Id. 
Like Seale, Ellis' issue on appeal is not imported verbatim from 
hi s statements in the trial transcript, ye1" • s= apparent from, the 
context of the proceeding, Id, . - . j. -.-.- :. ei ise thet ne of tl le 
trial that had occurred just one day before this hearing was 
wbpt-^er " •• was a party to a drug deal that went bad or a victim 
of theft. 
Additionally, there was no direct evidence to this end except 
I a-i /. ~v -~: his codefendant. Smith, 90 9 
P. 2d at 243; see also A.L. luxiiL T.A (discussing heightened 
importance of Meek's testimony in light, of biased and conflicting 
evidence presented at t::i : :i a ] ) ' understood the 
context of Ellis' objections is underscores given that the same 
judge presided over the trial as over the hearing. Cf., State v. 
Mitchell "*9Ra^ (defendant need not 
renew objection at trial if he made objection in a pre-trial 
hearing and the same judge presided over hearing and trial) ; State 
v Johnson i I I iTTfah 1 ii,rH According] ;; ' :i t was 
clear from the context of Ellis' argument that he sought Meek's 
5 
testimony as substantive evidence of his defense. Ellis' objection 
as articulated at trial should be construed to find preservation of 
the issues given that they are "apparent from the context" of the 
proceeding. Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). 
Based on the foregoing, Ellis adequately preserved his issue 
for appeal. Ellis' objection as articulated provided the trial 
court with an opportunity to rule on its merits and a address any 
errors. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161. Accordingly, Ellis is not 
precluded from raising the issue on appeal. 
Even if Ellis did not preserve the issue below, the issue 
merits review under the plain error doctrine. Pursuant to Rule 
103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court may take "notice 
of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court." See also Eldredge, 773 
P.2d at 35-36. To establish plain error, the appellant must show 
that " (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful," i.e., 
the error affects a substantive right of the accused. State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see also Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
at 35. 
Under the foregoing, the trial court committed plain error 
meriting review of Ellis's appeal even if Ellis did not properly 
preserve the issue below.4 First, Ellis established all the 
4
 Generally, when an appellant asserts "plain error" on 
appeal, the corollary claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is also raised. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 
App. 1992)(noting symmetry of prejudice requirement under plain 
error and ineffective assistance analysis). However, Ellis need 
6 
factors set forth, i11 State v. Oliver, 82 0 P. 2d 4 74 (Utah App. 
19 9] ) , ce:r t. denied, o4J i , ,A1 ' In Mil illn I " i i pcessitat m i x 
continuance and, thus, an error exists. Id. at 476 (to establish 
need for continuance, moving party must show new evidence is 
mateiidl, new evidei ice . - i * 
diligence in preparing, and moving party would suffer prejudice 
absent continuance) ; see also A.B. Point I-II (discussing how Ellis 
tuii-L-Lj-s yliver cr iteria) . 
Next, the "error should have been obvious to the trial court." 
Id, Ut:--- 1~ * teaches that, in the analogous context of requests 
for new L-ia^B in light of new evidence, a - - •..-?&&&!/ 
where new evidence is independent, corroborative of the defendant's 
c a ^ •• * , !—tested issue that [arises] between [the 
key witness] ana _Li.- derenaant i " State v. James, 
794 (Utah 1991); see also Jensen v. Logan, 57 P.2d T.- •".. • (Utah 
: — - - ' di si nterested testimony on the 
vital point, in a case is very ocant" oi non-existent); State v. 
Duncan, ; - • - f . • ->: 94 2) (same) . 
• ^ rv-" *• ' •-•- been 
apparent to the court given that defense counsel argued the motion 
for the continuance before the trial court. P..13'7. Even assuming 
- ,, ,
 t, :^ _~*_ - •-;-" -if- -juid b e , i t 
was clear enough to alert the court ic ;.ne existence of the error 
in the first place. 
not raise a claim of ineffective assistance on appeal since his 
trial counsel did in fact argue the motion for the continuance 
before the trial court. 
7 
Consequently, the trial court should have known that Meek's 
testimony was important since it was material and the only 
independent corroborating evidence going to Ellis' defense theory. 
See A.B. Point I.A. Whether the events amounted to a drug buy and 
a disgruntled Irvin or whether this was a case of theft was a vital 
issue in Ellis' trial. Id. The only other evidence concerning 
this key issue consisted of Irvin's word against that of Ellis and 
Carter, evidence that is "interested" by definition. Id. 
Consequently, where Utah case law is clear, the error in denying 
the continuance should have been obvious to the trial court. See 
James, 819 P.2d at 794; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. 
Finally, denial of the continuance constitutes harmful error 
since denial of the continuance precluded Ellis from presenting 
independent corroborating evidence in support of his defense5. In 
the absence of Meek's testimony, it is difficult to "discovert] the 
nature or magnitude of the resulting prejudice to [Ellis] ." State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987) (noting "difficulties 
posed" in assessing prejudice where record is silent or evidence is 
absent; appellant need only make a credible showing of prejudice). 
Nonetheless, Ellis was probably "material[ly] prejudice[d]" 
5
 Without benefit of the continuance and the opportunity 
to present Meek's testimony, Ellis was precluded from exercising 
his "right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his 
behalf." State v. Barnes, 409 A.2d 988, 990 (R.I. 1979); see 
also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 
L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) ("Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 
'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense'") 
(citing U.S. Const, amend VI (Compulsory Process and 
Confrontation Clauses); U.S. Const, amend XIV (Due Process 
Clause)). Id. (citation omitted). 
8 
and/or the "trial result would have been different had the 
cont j i iuai i• : :  I: € BI i granted '"' -^^
 V^ _L. 
benefit the continuance and the opportunity r,c l^rtner 
investigate Meek's statements, Ellis' case went to trial based on 
the c o n f 1 i c t :i i i g it: • a s t :i in o i :i :i e s : • f e a c I I ]:: ai, i t: } r \ \; :i 1 1 I o i 11: : 11 I e r 
independent evidence going to the vital issue concerning whether 
this was a theft or a drug bi ly Given that * - evidence before the 
court was subj ect 1: :: • J ai yi i lg :i nterpr-
influenced to convict in the absence of Meek's testimony. See 
James, 819 P.2d at 794 (information from "neutral" source assumes 
"different quality in the eyes < > I I hi jurors who assess f- he 
credibility of the witnesses"); see also A.B. Point II (discussing 
how denial of continuance resulted * material prejudice / 
different trial outcome in light of dli tacLors .in K.I 1 :i s case). 
Based or- the foregoing, Ellis issue on appeal merits review 
under '*• - ,:* ' ---rror" doctrine even if he did not adequately 
preserve the issue f or appea 1 i n the 11 ia ] court. See Utal l I ;;! 
Evid. 103(d). 
II. ELLIS ESTABLISHED THAT THE NEW EVIDENCE WAS MATERIAL 
TO THE ISSUE OF GUILT FOR PURPOSES OF THE OLIVER ANALYSIS 
FOR DETERMINING THE NECESSITY OF A CONTINUANCE. 
The State contends that Ellis did not establish the necessity 
c - grounds: 1 ) Meek's testimony is 
immaterial ;...-• •..--. . -a sue ol gui.:.^; and ,:) Kills did not show ^::z\z 
the unnamed witness identified by Meek was available to testify or 
9 
that the testimony would be material.6 S.B. 16-22. 
A. Meek's Testimony: 
The State initially asserts that "defense counsel was unable 
to positively confirm Meek's alleged acquaintance with Irvin [and] 
the trial court might reasonably have felt less than certain that 
Meek was actually referring to [Irvin.]"7 S.B.17. 
The State's contention is not supported by the Record nor 
reasonable on its merits. First, the name "Joshua Irvin" is unique 
and is not likely to be duplicated within Cyprus High School, where 
Meek knew Irvin. R.137[2] . Second, although Irvin testified that 
he grew up in Kearns, he testified that he resided in West Valley 
at the time of trial. R.134[l]. Contrary to the State's 
suggestion, this fact does not discredit Meek's assertion that he 
knew Irvin from Cyprus High School in West Valley; Irvin could have 
commuted to the neighboring city of West Valley from Kearns, or he 
could have moved to West Valley by the time he went to high school. 
Finally, Meek indicated that Irvin was tall and had long blond 
6
 The State also contends that Ellis did not establish 
prejudice resulting from the denial of the continuance. S.B. 22-
25. Ellis submits on his opening brief as his rebuttal to the 
State's unfounded assertion that the outcome of trial was not 
changed as a result of the denial of the continuance. See A.B. 
24-31. 
7
 The State challenges the materiality of Meek's statements 
on a number of grounds, including speculativeness of the content 
and relevancy to the issues before the trial court. Each of 
these arguments are addressed in Ellis' opening brief and need 
not be reiterated here. See A.B. 15-16 (discussing why the 
content of Meek's testimony is not speculative), 9-19 (discussing 
materiality of Meek's testimony). The remainder of the State's 
challenges to the materiality of Meek's testimony will be 
addressed herein. 
10 
hair. R.137[2]. Although there is nothing in the record to 
confirm or deny Meek's description of Irvin, it seems unlikely that 
defense counsel would have presented such information to the judge, 
who had seen Irvin, if it were inconsistent with Irvin's overall 
appearance. Accordingly, Meek communicated sufficient information 
to establish that he was referring to the same Irvin that accused 
Ellis and Carter of theft. 
The State also contends that there were concerns of 
authenticity since Meek's testimony was not presented in affidavit 
form. See S.B.17. However, as the State itself acknowledges, 
"Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure [(1998)], does not 
require that an affidavit accompany a motion." S.B.17. Moreover, 
the cases cited by the State in support of its assertion do not 
actually hold that an affidavit weighs in favor of granting a 
continuance upon newly discovered information. Indeed, State v. 
Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 
1993) , stands for the opposite proposition that denial of a 
continuance is proper where an affidavit exists because the moving 
party has access to the information in an alternative format if not 
through a live witness. Id. at 714-15. 
State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1988), likewise does not 
support the State's claim because the recommended use of the 
affidavit in that case had nothing to do with the authenticity of 
the anticipated testimony. The defendant in Linden moved for a 
continuance but did not provide names or addresses of the 
anticipated witnesses, claiming that he was unable to do so due to 
11 
his incarceration. Id. at 13 87. The trial court denied the 
continuance and the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 1388. The 
Court reasoned that the "record before us is completely barren . 
. . [and] Defendant prepared no affidavit to show that he attempted 
in good faith to contact his witnesses but was unable to do so." 
Id. at 1387. Hence, the Linden Court was recommending use of an 
affidavit to show that defendant made a good faith effort to meet 
his burden to "place that information before the trial court," id. , 
and not to establish authenticity of the anticipated testimony. As 
noted above, Ellis met his burden to place all the information that 
he had before the court. In any event, the State did not contest 
Ellis' good faith effort below, thereby implicitly indicating its 
satisfaction with Ellis' effort. R.137. 
By a similar token, the State misrelies on James. In that 
case, the Supreme Court cited State v. Duncan, 132 P.2d 121 (Utah 
1942) , a case in which the use of an affidavit was noted because it 
was the only "disinterested testimony on the vital point" and other 
evidence was "scant." James, 819 P.2d at 794 n.41. Contrary to 
the State's assertion, therefore, the James and Duncan decisions do 
not recommend affidavits to establish authenticity of anticipated 
testimony so much as they find them material when no other 
disinterested evidence is available. 
The State finally challenges Meek's testimony on foundational 
grounds, stating it is nothing more than "evidence of an 
unsubstantiated use of an unrelated drug, [i.e., methamphetamine 
versus marijuana,] remote in time, for the purpose of showing 
12 
current drug use." S.B.18. 
The State ignores the fact that Meek's testimony responds 
directly to Irvin's preliminary hearing testimony that it was not 
his "usual practice" to solicit drugs from strangers and his later 
trial testimony that he did not use marijuana at all and that he 
made his preliminary hearing statement out of sarcasm. R.134[25]. 
The use of prior conduct to impeach a witness is a legitimate trial 
objective under Rule 608(b) (1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See 
Utah R. Evid. 608(b)(1) (1998) (although generally inadmissible, 
"[s]pecific instances of conduct of a witness . . . , if probative 
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness")8. 
8
 The State incidentally asserts that the "alleged specific 
instances of Irvin's prior methamphetamine use and drug purchase 
would almost certainly be excluded under Rule 608, Utah Rules of 
Evidence." S.B.14. The State then quotes Rule 608 in part, 
leaving out the section quoted above which provides for admission 
of specific instances of bad conduct to impeach a witness on 
cross-examination. See Utah R. Evid. 608(b)(1) (quoted above). 
The State likewise misrelies on State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 
702 (Utah App.), cert, denied 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993), which is 
distinguishable from the instant case. In Martinez, the 
defendant was charged with distribution and asserted an 
entrapment defense. Id. at 704. The facts alleged that the 
undercover officer at one point pretended to snort cocaine with 
defendant during the investigation. Id. at 703. The officer at 
trial testified that she was not a drug user. Id. at 704. 
Defendant moved to admit eyewitness testimony that the officer 
had used cocaine in the past. Id. The trial court denied the 
motion and this Court affirmed. Id. at 704-05. The Court 
reasoned that the evidence was "extrinsic" and "interjected an 
irrelevant issue." Id. at 705 (quoting United States v. 
Phillips, 888 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1989) ("testimony [that 
undercover agents used cocaine at party during investigation of 
defendant] would . . . create a swearing contest about a matter . 
. . 'far removed from the case'"). 
Contrary to Martinez, information concerning Irvin's past 
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In turn, Meek's testimony assumes a material and substantive 
quality since the evidence going to the controverted issue of 
whether this was a drug buy or a theft consists only of the 
contradictory testimony of Irvin against that of Ellis and Carter. 
As noted by the James Court, "[e]vidence from a neutral third 
party, [Meek,] is not merely cumulative. . . . It is of a different 
kind and nature than defendant's statements, and it certainly could 
have a different quality in the eyes of the jurors who assess the 
credibility of the witnesses." 819 P. 2d at 794; cf. , State v. 
Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah App. 1991) (in rape case where 
evidence consisted only of defendant's testimony against victim's, 
evidence of drug paraphernalia discredited defendant's testimony 
that he was not under influence and thus did not force victim when 
he had intercourse with her). Hence, Meek's testimony is material 
insofar as it corroborates Ellis' testimony on a contested issue 
drug use and purchasing habit goes to the central issue of 
whether the events of this case amounted to theft or a foiled 
drug deal by impeaching his claim that he did not use drugs or 
buy them from strangers. See, e.a., State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 
481-82 (Utah App. 1991) (evidence of drug paraphernalia found 
during search of rape suspect's home admissible under Rule 
608(b)(1) to impeach his trial testimony that he was not under 
the influence when he had intercourse with victim); State v. 
Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 824 (Utah App. 1990) (pursuant to Rule 
608(b) (1), cross-examination of defendant about cocaine use was 
proper to impeach testimony that he forged checks for money to 
move into another house); State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah 
1979) (evidence that defendant pointed gun at manslaughter victim 
one week prior to incident admissible to impeach defendant's 
statement that he did not do so). Consequently, contrary to the 
State's assertion, Meek's testimony about Irvin's prior drug use 
and purchasing habit would be admissible under Utah R. Evid. 
608(b) (1) to impeach his testimony. Moreover, such evidence was 
relevant to the central issue in dispute, namely whether Irvin 
was robbed or was a disgruntled participant in a drug deal. 
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while discrediting Irvin's claims against drug use and purchasing9. 
In light of the foregoing and Ellis' argument in his opening 
brief, Point I.A., Meek's testimony is sufficiently material to 
merit a continuance in this case. 
B. Testimony Of The Drug Supplier: 
The State challenges the need for the continuance on the 
grounds that the substance of the supplier's testimony was 
speculative and, hence, immaterial. See S.B.22. 
As with Meek's testimony, Ellis defined the anticipated 
content of the supplier's testimony when he stated, "if we were to 
find the person who [Irvin] owes money to for drugs and [they] 
actually went to school together and were friends together, that 
would impeach [Irvin's] statement." R.137[3]. Hence, the showing 
of materiality here does not fail for lack of definitiveness since 
Ellis presented enough information to the court to "pass upon its 
9
 The State relies on State v. Humphreys, 707 P.2d 109 
(Utah 1985), State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987), and 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) in asserting that 
evidence concerning Irvin's "unsubstantiated" drug use, "remote 
in time," is not material to the instant case and therefore a 
continuance is not warranted. However, these cases are 
distinguishable in that none of the evidence that the parties 
sought to introduce in the those cases was necessary to impeach a 
key witness on a vital point. See Humphreys, 707 P.2d at 109-10 
(continuance not warranted where new witness would only offer 
evidence that would mitigate defendant's liability); see, e.g., 
DeAlo, 748 P.2d at 199 (finding error to admit during State's 
case in chief evidence of defendant's involvement in interstate 
cocaine distribution scheme because it bore no relation to 
cocaine seized in Utah or resulting distribution charge); 
Featherson, 781 P.2d at 428-29 (finding error to admit during 
State's case in chief evidence of prior rape conviction and two 
incidences of assault which did not result in convictions since 
they were remote in time and had no relation to current 
aggravated assault charge). 
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materiality."10 State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). 
Moreover, the supplier's testimony would directly refute Irvin's 
denial that he purchased drugs in the past. See A.B. Point I.A. 
Accordingly, Ellis fulfilled his burden to define the content of 
the hoped-for testimony and its materiality before the trial court. 
See Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476 (moving party must establish 
materiality); Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752 (party fails to establish 
materiality where the content of hoped-for testimony is so 
speculative that trial court cannot assess materiality). 
The State alternatively contends that a continuance is not 
merited because Ellis "patently failed" to make the required 
showing that the unknown drug supplier indicated by Meek would be 
available to testify within a reasonable time. S.B.21-22. As 
noted by Ellis in his opening brief, a continuance was needed to 
discover the identity and the whereabouts of the drug supplier in 
the first place. Consequently, Ellis was not required, and indeed 
could not make that availability showing at that juncture in the 
10
 The State inappropriately relies on State v. Williams, 
712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) and Humphreys, 707 P.2d at 109-10. 
In those cases, the defendants could not offer the trial court 
any information about the hoped-for testimony. See Williams, 712 
P.2d at 222 (defendant admitted he "[had] no idea" what new 
witness would testify to); Humphreys, 707 P.2d at 109-10 
(defendant merely indicated that hoped-for witness would offer 
information that would mitigate defendant's liability for theft 
by deception). Ellis, by contrast, offered a definite outline of 
the supplier's information that is qualitatively different than 
the ambiguous and open-ended assertions exemplified in Humphreys 
and Williams. Consequently, the State's reliance on those cases 
is misplaced. 
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proceeding11. See A.B. 19-20. 
In any event, the continuance is merited by Meek's testimony 
alone, with or without establishing the availability of the unknown 
supplier or the materiality of his testimony. See supra Point II; 
A.B. Point I-II. Accordingly, the fact that Ellis could not 
establish the availability of the drug supplier indicated by Meek 
does not negate the need for the continuance in this case12. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the trial court's abuse of discretion in denying a 
continuance, Ellis respectfully requests this court to reverse 
his conviction and remand for a new trial. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument. 
11
 The State also speculates that the drug supplier would 
not make himself available for trial. Ellis, however, could 
subpoena the supplier or secure an affidavit from him based on a 
showing of unavailability. 
12
 The State relies on a Rhode Island case, Barnes, 409 
A.2d at 991, for the proposition that a continuance is not 
merited where the moving party requests it to discern the 
whereabouts of a possible witness. Barnes is distinguishable 
from the instant case in that the sole justification for seeking 
the continuance was to discover the location of the absent 
witness. Id. Moreover, the defendant in Barnes failed to 
exercise due diligence in otherwise locating the witness before 
trial commenced. Id. Ellis, by contrast, had an alternative 
justification for the continuance (Meek) and diligently prepared 
for trial before requesting the continuance. See A.B. Point I.A, 
I.C. 
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